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*
ABSTRACT
Featuring prominently in the last four sets of Supreme Court confirmation hearings, 
the judge-as-umpire analogy has become the dominant frame for understanding the role 
of the Justice and may also now act as a significant constraint on judicial behavior. 
Strong criticisms from legal academics and journalists attacking the realism of the 
analogy have had little destabilizing effect. This Essay argues that the best hope for 
shifting the public conception of the work of a Justice is to offer a counteranalogy that 
draws from an equally intuitive and familiar context, while also capturing the core 
essence of Supreme Court adjudication—the particular process of creative interpretation 
and explanation. The metaphor of the Justice as color commentator in the press box not 
only meets these criteria, but also makes explicit that judges are not robotic, objective 
arbiters. Moreover, in exposing the myth of judicial rationality and neutrality bolstered 
by the umpire analogy, the commentator alternative provides the possibility of helping 
Justices to better control for their biases and reducing damaging episodes of cognitive 
illiberalism. As further evidence of the appropriateness and robustness of the 
commentator analogy, the Essay concludes by demonstrating how sports commentating 
can be critiqued employing the precise implements developed by legal scholars to 
analyze judicial decisionmaking.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION
 “[A] judge is like a surgeon . . . .”
1
 A judge is like a platoon leader.
2
“ ‘A judge is like a carpenter . . . .’ ”
3
 A judge is like an oyster.
4
 Over the centuries, we have used analogies not only to make sense 
of the work of judges, but also for instrumental purposes. In many 
instances, we have formulated judicial metaphors in order to define 
the role of the judge and to empower or constrain actual legal actors, 
rather than simply to explain or describe the nature of judging. Some 
analogies have arisen with seemingly little deliberate cultivation, 
emerging in line with basic intuitions about authority, reason, and 
fairness. However, various individuals and entities have also 
intentionally introduced and championed specific judicial metaphors 
to accomplish particular ends and advance particular agendas.  
 As Aaron Zelinsky points out in his recent, widely reported essay, 
The Justice as Commissioner: Benching the Judge-Umpire Analogy,
in the United States today perhaps no metaphor is more dominant 
than the judge as umpire.
5
 Reinvigorated during the 2005 Supreme 
Court confirmation hearings of Chief Justice John Roberts,
6
 the
 1. RICHARD H. KRAEMER ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF TEXAS POLITICS 185 (10th ed. 2008). 
 2. Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of 
Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 189-90 (1987). 
 3. The Administration of Justice in Russia as Illustrated by Its Proverbs, 19 J.
JURISPRUDENCE 642, 642 (1875) (citing Russian Proverbs, 139 LONDON Q. REV. 273 (1875)).  
 4. Stephanie Leonard Yarbrough, The Jury Consultant—Friend or Foe of Justice, 54 
SMU L. REV. 1885, 1899 (2001). 
 5. Aaron S.J. Zelinsky, The Justice as Commissioner: Benching the Judge-Umpire 
Analogy, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 113, 124 (2010), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-
law-journal-pocket-part/supreme-court/the-justice-as-commissioner:-benching-the-judge% 
11umpire-analogy/. The piece has garnered an unusual amount of attention, with coverage 
in the Wall Street Journal’s online edition, Litigation and Trial, and SCOTUSBlog, among 
other publications. See, e.g., Ashby Jones, If Judges Aren’t Umpires, What Are They? A Yale 
3L Answers, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Mar. 10, 2010, 5:36 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/ 
03/10/if-judges-arent-umpires-what-are-they-a-yale-3l-answers/; Maxwell S. Kennerly, 
Trial Judges Are Not Umpires, LITIG. & TRIAL (Mar. 11, 2010), 
http://www.litigationandtrial.com/2010/03/articles/the-law/for-people/trial-judges-are-not- 
umpires/. 
 6. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief 
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55-56 
(2005) [hereinafter Roberts Confirmation Hearings] (statement of J. John Roberts) (“Judges 
are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them. . . . They make sure 
everybody plays by the rules . . . . [A]nd I will remember that it’s my job to call balls and 
strikes, and not to pitch or bat.”). 
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analogy was front and center in the subsequent hearings of Justices 
Samuel Alito,
7
 Sonia Sotomayor,
8
 and Elena Kagan.
9
 Like many other critics, Zelinsky challenges the accuracy of the 
analogy, but goes further to offer a replacement: the Supreme Court 
Justice as commissioner of Major League Baseball.
10
 Zelinsky makes a compelling argument that Justices are similar 
to commissioners in four key ways—“they provide . . . guidance to 
subordinates, undertake extended deliberation, take countermajoritarian 
action, and wield substantial rulemaking power.”
11
 However, the 
analogy ultimately falls short because it fails—just like the umpire 
analogy—to capture what is arguably the most fundamental aspect of 
the work of a Justice: the process of creative interpretation and 
explanation. More importantly, although Zelinsky’s analogy offers a 
 7. Senators Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), Charles Schumer (D-
New York), and Herbert Kohl (D-Wisconsin) all referenced the analogy during their 
comments and questions, as did Third Circuit Judge Anthony Scirica in his testimony.
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an Associate Justice 
of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 14 (2006) (statement of Sen. Charles E. Grassley) (“[I]t appears that Judge 
Alito tries to act like an umpire, calling the balls and strikes, rather than advocating a 
particular outcome.”); id. at 10 (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch) (“When he was here last 
fall, Chief Justice Roberts compared judges to umpires who apply rules they did not write 
and cannot change to the competition before them. We do not evaluate an umpire’s 
performance based on which team won the game, but on how that umpire applied the rules 
inning after inning. We do not hire umpires by showing them the roster for the upcoming 
season and demanding to know which teams they will favor before those teams even take 
the field.”).
 8. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to be an 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 57-59 (2009) (statement of J. Sonia Sotomayor); Bruce Weber, 
Umpires v. Judges, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2009, at WK 1 (chronicling the use of the umpire 
analogy during the Sotomayor hearings). 
 9. Just prior to the beginning of the hearings, Senator John Cornyn (R-Texas) 
argued that the key question was whether Kagan was able to “take off the mantle of 
political strategist, political adviser, and assume the role of a disinterested, impartial 
judge, calling balls and strikes.” CNN Wire Staff, Senators Signal Contentious Hearing on 
Supreme Court Nominee, CNN.COM (June 28, 2010, 11:34 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/ 
POLITICS/06/27/senate.supreme.court/index.html?hpt=T2. During the actual hearing, 
Senator Amy Klobuchar (D-Minnesota) asked Kagan about her views on the analogy. See 
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th 
Cong. (2010) [hereinafter Kagan Confirmation Hearings] (“Do you think the balls-and-
strikes analogy is a useful one, and does it have its limits?”). Kagan suggested that it was 
“correct in several important respects”: “[Y]ou expect that the judge, as you expect the 
umpire, not to have a team in the game. . . . [T]here’s got to be neutrality. . . .  [T]here’s got 
to be fairness to both parties . . . .” Id. Kagan also stated that she believed that the 
metaphor was apt in capturing that “[j]udges . . . [are] not the most important people in our 
democratic system of government.” Id. However, she also explained that “like all 
metaphors, it does have its limits” and could be misleading: “[T]he metaphor might suggest 
to some people that law is a kind of robotic enterprise. . . . [T]hat’s not right. And . . . 
especially not right at the Supreme Court level where the hardest cases go . . . . [L]aw does 
require a kind of judgment, a kind of wisdom.” Id.
 10. Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 114. 
 11. Id.
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challenge to Chief Justice Roberts’ assertion that judges, like 
umpires, do not make rules, they only apply them, it does not contest 
Roberts’ far more consequential claim that judges are objective, 
neutral arbiters who stand removed from the world, without 
significant biases or corrupting allegiances.
12
 Indeed, Zelinsky’s 
analogy appears to bolster this myth.   
 Even without venturing beyond the realm of sports, this Essay 
argues that it is possible to find a far superior analogy that directly 
addresses these concerns: the Justice as color commentator.
13
 Part II.A begins by making the case that there is value in devoting 
more scholarly attention to popular analogies in law and, specifically, 
in moving beyond critiquing existing metaphors to exploring possible 
alternatives that share common backdrops and basic components to 
facilitate comparison and deeper understanding. Part II.B then offers 
evidence that the commentator analogy is not only more accurate 
than the umpire or commissioner alternatives in capturing the core 
aspects of Supreme Court adjudication, but also draws attention to 
the reality that judges are not rational, neutral, and objective 
arbiters. In making the case for the latter proposition, Part II.C 
examines research from the mind sciences that reveals that judges, 
laymen, and even actual referees are all subject to cognitive 
processes and structures that can bias their assessments and actions, 
often beyond their conscious awareness or control. This leads to the 
conclusion that the commentator analogy may be a useful tool in 
reducing the impact of these biases, as well as damaging episodes of 
cognitive illiberalism. Finally, Part III demonstrates the robustness 
 12. See Roberts Confirmation Hearings, supra note 6, at 55-56. Outside of the 
Supreme Court confirmation hearing context, a number of sitting judges have also affirmed 
the umpire analogy. See, e.g., Helgeland v. Wis. Muns., 745 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Wis. 2008) (“[A] 
judge’s job is like an umpire’s, . . . to make calls according to the rules, not according to the 
voices of a partisan crowd.”); State v. Dabbs, No. 01C01-9308-CR-00253, 1994 WL 504413, 
at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 1994) (“Much like an umpire in a baseball game who does 
not make the rules defining the strike zone but must only call the balls and the strikes, the 
jurist has the duty to apply the laws as written.”). 
 13. This Essay considers color commentators—that is, sports broadcasters charged 
with providing analysis, background, and context to supplement the play-by-play 
reporting—generally because the dynamics of interest are largely consistent across many 
sports. Indeed, given that Justices regularly engage different areas of law, perhaps the best 
analogy would be to the multisport commentator who must contend with multiple sets of 
rules, traditions, and expectations. In comparing the color commentator to other analogues, 
the Essay focuses solely on (1) the MLB commissioner because Zelinsky does not address 
other sports, and (2) the baseball umpire because it is the dominant analogue and because 
there is significant variability in the responsibilities and practices of officials in different 
sports. See, e.g., Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, U.S. Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, The Annual Herbert W. Vaughan Lecture on America’s Founding Principles: 
The Role of the Federal Judge Under the Constitution: Some Perspectives from the Ninth 
Circuit 6-7 (Oct. 22, 2009), http://web.princeton.edu/sites/jmadison/calendar/documents/ 
Vaughan%20Lecture.doc.pdf (arguing that a football referee analogy is superior to an 
umpire analogy because football referees have less discretion than umpires). 
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of the analogy by showing how sports commentating can be critiqued 
using the exact tools developed by legal academics to analyze judicial 
decisionmaking. As an example, this Essay adapts Karl Llewellyn’s 
famous analysis of the canons of statutory construction used by 
appellate judges to the press box context.  
II.  THE JUSTICE AS COLOR COMMENTATOR
A.  The Value of a New Analogy 
 The judge-as-umpire analogy, while undoubtedly influential, has 
sparked a considerable amount of vitriol,
14
 and an initial question is 
whether offering analogies for judging is appropriate at all. Why not 
simply describe the work of judges or speak plainly about what they 
should do without resorting to any sort of comparison to other 
domains? Who needs a metaphor? 
 The answer—at least partially—is that conceptualizing a judge’s 
role without resorting to metaphor is likely to be extremely difficult 
and ultimately unhelpful. Metaphors are part of who we are. As 
linguists, psychologists, and others have documented, human 
cognition is grounded in metaphor.
15
 According to George Lakoff and 
Mark Johnson, “[M]etaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in 
language but in thought and action.”
16
 Analogies are not superfluous 
decoration to ornament our sentences; they form the basic structure 
of our understanding of the world.
17
 In the words of David Leary, “All 
 14. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 78-79 (2008) (condemning the 
analogy as highly inaccurate); Michael P. Allen, A Limited Defense of (at Least Some of) the 
Umpire Analogy, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 525, 526 (2009) (noting that most of the academic 
commentary “has been highly critical of the comparison”); Paul Butler, Rehnquist, Racism, 
and Race Jurisprudence, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1019, 1035 (2006) (faulting the analogy for 
being misleading and incomplete); Erwin Chemerinsky, Seeing the Emperor’s Clothes: 
Recognizing the Reality of Constitutional Decision Making, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1069, 1069 
(2006) (arguing that it “is hard to think of a less apt analogy”); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu 
Gulati, Ranking Judges According to Citation Bias (as a Means to Reduce Bias), 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1279, 1279-80 (2007) (criticizing the analogy for its lack of realism); Neil S. 
Siegel, Umpires at Bat: On Integration and Legitimation, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 701, 701-02 
(2007) (noting the failures of the analogy). 
 15. See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 3 (1980) 
[hereinafter LAKOFF & JOHNSON, METAPHORS]. In other work, George Lakoff and Mark 
Johnson have identified a set of “primary metaphors” (e.g., “Affection Is Warmth,” 
“Important Is Big,” “Happy Is Up,” and “Categories Are Containers”) that lie at the core of 
our beliefs and perceptions, and guide our interactions. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON,
PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN 
THOUGHT 50-54 (1999). 
 16. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, METAPHORS, supra note 15, at 3.
 17. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK TURNER, MORE THAN COOL REASON: A FIELD GUIDE TO 
POETIC METAPHOR, at xi (1989) (“Far from being merely a matter of words, metaphor is a 
matter of thought—all kinds of thought: thought about emotion, about society, about 
human character, about language, and about the nature of life and death. It is 
indispensable not only to our imagination but also to our reason.”).  
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knowledge is ultimately rooted in metaphorical (or analogical) modes 
of perception and thought.”
18
 It follows that metaphors are of central importance to law and 
legal reasoning.
19
 As Thomas Ross has articulated, in our legal realm, 
“liens float, corporations reside, minds hold meetings, and promises 
run with the land. The constitutional landscape is dotted with 
streams, walls, and poisonous trees. And these wonderful things are 
cradled in the seamless web of law.”
20
 Our legal metaphors make our 
arguments more persuasive, shed light on abstract and abstruse 
concepts, help us reason, and facilitate creativity, among many other 
things.
21
 In his strong defense of reasoning by analogy, Cass Sunstein 
has pointed out that the analogical approach is not just for judges 
and legal academics, but “the mode through which the ordinary 
lawyer typically operates.”
22
 Indeed, even if we wanted to, it seems 
hard to imagine legal actors being able to function without resorting 
to analogies.
23
 As Sunstein has explained further,  
In this light, it seems most unfortunate that analogical reasoning 
has fallen into ill repute. To abandon this method of reasoning 
may be to give up, far too quickly, on some of the most useful 
methods we have for evaluating our practices, and for deciding 
whether to change them through law.
24
 That said, even granting that metaphor has a place in legal 
discussions, one might question the prudence of offering a sports
analogy for judging. Why not look farther afield for the best 
possible metaphor?
 18. David E. Leary, Psyche’s Muse: The Role of Metaphor in the History of Psychology,
in METAPHORS IN THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY 1, 2 (David E. Leary ed., 1990). 
 19. Over the last thirty years, a number of legal scholars have asserted that we need 
to pay more attention to metaphors in the legal sphere. See, e.g., Adam Arms, Metaphor, 
Women and Law, 10 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 257, 257-58 (1999); James E. Murray, 
Understanding Law as Metaphor, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 714, 726-27 (1984); Thomas Ross, 
Metaphor and Paradox, 23 GA. L. REV. 1053, 1053 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, 
On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 742 (1993); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, 
Metaphors Matter: How Images of Battle, Sports, and Sex Shape the Adversary System, 10 
WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 225, 231 (1995).  
 20. Ross, supra note 19, at 1053. 
 21. See Chad M. Oldfather, The Hidden Ball: A Substantive Critique of Baseball 
Metaphors in Judicial Opinions, 27 CONN. L. REV. 17, 20-23 (1994).  
 22. Sunstein, supra note 19, at 748; see also Michael Boudin, Antitrust Doctrine and 
the Sway of Metaphor, 75 GEO. L.J. 395, 406 (1986) (noting that analogical thinking “has a 
natural appeal to lawyers versed in common law reasoning”). 
 23. See Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, Can a Law Teacher Avoid Teaching Legal Ethics?,
41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 8 (1991) (“If you were to tape your own classes, would you hear 
yourself speaking in war and sports metaphors?”); Michael J. Yelnosky, If You Write It, 
(S)he Will Come: Judicial Opinions, Metaphors, Baseball, and “The Sex Stuff,” 28 CONN. L.
REV. 813, 817-18 (1996) (“Judges may be unable to avoid the use of metaphors in their 
opinions because metaphors are fundamental tools of thought and language.”).  
 24. Sunstein, supra note 19, at 791. 
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 One of the major benefits of sticking to the realm of sports is that 
it is familiar to many people and does not require lengthy 
background description. We are a sports-obsessed culture—sports 
pervade our news coverage, advertising and marketing campaigns, 
casual conversations, video games, television programming, weekend 
free time, after-school activities, and many other aspects of our daily 
routines.
25
 We live sports and we know sports: indeed, about half of 
U.S. children are active in at least one sports program,
26
 and the vast 
majority of children have participated in an organized sport before 
they become an adult.
27
 Hence, sports analogies for judging arguably 
present the best opportunity to demystify the world of law for the 
widest possible cross-section of the public at a time when distrust of 
the judicial branch of government is high and when myths about the 
work of judges proliferate.
28
 One of the reasons that the umpire 
analogy has been so dominant—and has gained such widespread 
support from members of the public—is not that it is more accurate 
than the alternatives, but that it is readily cognizable by most people. 
It makes intuitive sense and resonates in a way that statistical 
analyses of appellate voting patterns and theories of 
countermajoritarian difficulties do not.  
 Without a doubt, some of the resistance to sports analogies has to 
do with the fact that sports are viewed as lowbrow and law is viewed 
as highbrow, and the notion that sports analogies “may detract 
unacceptably from the prestige and dignity indispensable to the 
judicial role.”
29
 But that impulse to insulate the scholarly and 
erudite legal sphere from debasement ignores the fact that sports 
 25. See, e.g., JAMES A. MICHENER, SPORTS IN AMERICA 9 (1976); Matthew J. Mitten, 
Forward: Symposium, Sports Law as a Reflection of Society’s Laws and Values, 38 S. TEX.
L. REV. 999, 999-1000 (1997). As Charles Yablom has written,  
Any American determined not to learn the fundamentals of baseball would 
have to make a lifelong effort to avoid all newspapers, television, playgrounds, 
and taverns, as well as certain forms of bubble gum and selected boxes of 
breakfast cereal. Anyone who chose to follow this unlikely . . . regimen would 
still likely wind up knowing what it means, in the American idiom, to “strike 
out,” “get to first base,” and “play in the big leagues.” 
Charles Yablon, On the Contribution of Baseball to American Legal Theory, 104 YALE L.J. 
227, 229 (1994). 
 26. See Douglas E. Abrams, Sports in the Courts: The Role of Sports References in 
Judicial Opinions, 17 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 6 (2010). 
 27. See id. at 6-7; Barri Katz Stryer, et al., A Developmental Overview of Child and Youth 
Sports in Society, 7 CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 697, 697 (1998). 
 28. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Our Fill-in-the-Blank Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
14, 2010, at A27 (arguing that the public has been swept up in “appealing but wholly 
disingenuous descriptions of what judges—liberal or conservative—actually do”); Public 
Views of Congress Recover Slightly, THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER (July 9, 2010), 
http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/632.pdf (noting that views of the Supreme Court are less 
positive than a year earlier). 
 29. Abrams, supra note 26, at 10. 
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already influence how we make sense of the world and our values—
including legal values.
30
 If sports analogies are corrupting, we are 
already corrupted.  
 In fact, as suggested earlier, judges commonly employ metaphors 
from sports. Even before the umpire analogy came to the fore, 
Supreme Court nominees spoke of their role by using sports 
references. In his Senate testimony, Clarence Thomas, for example, 
argued that a proper Justice ought “to be stripped . . . like a 
runner,”
31
and “shed [of] the baggage of ideology.”
32
 And in numerous 
contexts in opinions and at oral argument, the Supreme Court 
regularly employs sports analogies.
33
 Members of the Court criticize 
each other for “punt[ing]” on difficult legal questions,
34
 contest 
supposed “slam-dunk correlation[s],”
35
 and set out standards of when 
a product “fall[s] below par.”
36
 The fact that judges are both so fluent 
in sports metaphors and open to employing them suggests that 
articulating alternative sports analogies to the judge-as-umpire may 
actually have more of an impact on shaping future judicial behavior 
than other types of analogies.
37
 Offering alternatives and not just critiquing existing sports 
metaphors is of central importance. Judge Benjamin Cardozo was 
right that “[m]etaphors in law” must be “narrowly watched” because 
they can quickly become engrained, enslaving the very concepts and 
ideas they were meant to liberate.
38
 Yet the answer is not to reject 
metaphor altogether nor simply to point out the flaws in existing 
analogies (a quite easy and appealing tack, given that every 
analogy, by comparing nonidentical things, is subject to some 
criticism as misleading and incomplete). Rather, because people 
 30. “There is a reciprocal relationship between sports and societal values. Sports 
incorporates society’s existing values and reinforces these values on the playing field, in its 
rules, and through its established institutions. Sports also exports its principles and the 
lessons learned from participating in athletics and its governance to society in general.” 
Mitten, supra note 25, at 1000. See generally D. STANLEY EITZEN & GEORGE H. SAGE,
SOCIOLOGY OF NORTH AMERICAN SPORT 43-55 (6th ed. 1997); DREW A. HYLAND,
PHILOSOPHY OF SPORT 1-32 (1990).  
 31. Linda Greenhouse, The Thomas Hearings: In Trying to Clarify What He Is Not, 
Thomas Opens Question of What He Is, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1991, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1991/09/13/us/thomas-hearings-trying-clarify-what-he-not-thomas-opens-question-what-he.html 
(quoting J. Clarence Thomas).
 32. Id.
 33. See Abrams, supra note 26, at 11-44 (providing a survey of sports references in 
judicial opinions in the Supreme Court and the lower federal and state courts). 
 34. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 441 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 35. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 279 n.4 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 36. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 114 (2008). 
 37. In addition, in recent years, the Supreme Court has been filled with avid baseball 
fans so a baseball analogy may have more of an impact on the Justices than other potential 
analogies. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, This Bench Belongs in a Dugout, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 
2010, at A14.
 38. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926). 
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naturally gravitate towards metaphorical descriptions and 
explanations, there is a need to offer counter analogies as 
replacements—a project which legal scholars, aside from Zelinsky, 
have largely avoided.
39
 This presents the most promising avenue for 
avoiding the reification of the problematic judge-as-umpire analogy—
in Sunstein’s words, a way to show that “a judgment about likeness 
that seems constitutive of thought actually depends on contestable 
substantive arguments . . . .”
40
 Looking to sports for these alternatives has the added benefit of 
not only being familiar and intuitive (with resulting benefits in terms 
of influencing judicial and public audiences), but also focusing the 
discussion and facilitating comparison to the other two analogies 
currently on offer, which are both drawn from baseball. With possible 
judicial analogues all involved in the same “game,” it is easier to see 
the significant shortcomings of the umpire and commissioner vis-à-
vis the color commentator. In certain respects, the advantages of 
engaging a common metaphorical framework may be likened to those 
gained from the employment of shared, readily understood scenarios 
across experiments and studies in other disciplines.
41
 Finally, it may 
also be “fairer play” to critique the existing analogies on their “home 
field”: the claim in this Essay is that even without venturing beyond 
the sports arena, it is possible to find a more accurate and socially 
beneficial analogy for the Supreme Court Justice than either the 
umpire or commissioner.  
B.  The Color Commentator as Creative Interpreter 
 To convey accurately the work of a Supreme Court Justice, it is 
essential for any analogy to capture the process of Supreme Court 
adjudication. It is this process that most notably distinguishes sitting 
on the Supreme Court from legislating, serving as a trial court judge, 
or riding the bench in a foreign jurisdiction. Unpacking the process 
also lays the groundwork for understanding that judging is not a 
 39. See Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 113-14 (noting that “no workable substitute for the 
judge-umpire analogy has been advanced”). 
 40. Sunstein, supra note 19, at 749. 
 41. One of the best examples might be the use of variations on the famous trolley 
problem in philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroethics. See, e.g., Philippa Foot, The 
Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect, 5 OXFORD REV. 5, 8 (1967) (“[You 
are] the driver of a runaway tram which [you] can only steer from one narrow track on to 
another; five men are working on one track and one man on the other; anyone on the track 
[you] enter[] is bound to be killed.” Should you flip the switch if it will cause one person to 
die instead of five?).  
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simple matter of fairly reading the law and applying it to facts 
objectively viewed,
42
 the focus of Part II.C.  
 Although Justices and color commentators are guided by different 
ultimate goals and have different ultimate impacts on society,
43
 in 
their work, they employ an analogous process of creative 
interpretation and explanation. The process is characterized by (1) 
commentating on the actions and assessments of others without 
being directly involved in unfolding events; (2) creative interpretation 
that is facilitated through collaboration, constrained by precedent or 
existing knowledge, and initiated by a concrete real-world 
interaction, not a hypothetical situation or general concern; and (3) 
the construction of narratives that contextualize, explain, and 
connect, rather than simply declare a judgment. Neither umpires 
nor commissioners engage all three of these facets of interpretation 
and explanation. 
 1.  Interpretive Distance
 Justices, like color commentators, are removed from the action. In 
contrast to umpires, they are not engaging with players and 
participating in events as the game transpires. While umpires are 
part of the field of play by rule, Justices and color commentators 
quite clearly are not.
44
 A partial consequence of this distance is that 
Justices and commentators are largely addressing actions and events 
that have already occurred in which other individuals have already 
made assessments and determinations.
45
 In the case of a Justice, a 
police officer may have stopped and frisked a suspect and a trial 
 42. See Justice David H. Souter, Text of Justice David Souter’s Speech Harvard 
Commencement Remarks (May 27, 2010), http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2010/05/ 
text-of-justice-david-souters-speech. 
 43. Justices (and the judiciary) are largely focused on achieving just, fair, and 
accurate outcomes, whereas color commentators (and the larger sports establishment, of 
which umpires and commissioners are a part) are primarily concerned with entertaining. 
Likewise, the interpretations and determinations of Justices have binding effect on 
individuals, whereas the interpretations and determinations of color commentators 
influence individuals without mandating action or inaction. While these differences are 
worth noting, the claim is not that a color commentator is precisely like a Justice in every 
respect (no analogue offers perfect mimesis), but rather that the commentator analogy 
better captures the core work of a Justice than the alternatives, while also offering added 
debiasing benefits.  
 44. See, e.g., Playing Rules Comm., Major League Baseball, Official Baseball Rules R. 
5.08 (2010), available at http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/downloads/y2010/official_rules/ 
2010_OfficialBaseballRules.pdf (“If a thrown ball accidentally touches a base coach, or a 
pitched or thrown ball touches an umpire, the ball is alive and in play.”); id. 6.08(d) (“If a 
fair ball touches an umpire after having passed a fielder other than the pitcher, or having 
touched a fielder, including the pitcher, the ball is in play.”). 
 45. The cases and controversies already exist prior to the Supreme Court entering 
into the picture, and with respect to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, another body has 
already reached a judgment by the time the Justices begin considering a matter. See U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2. 
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court judge may have ruled that drug paraphernalia found on the 
suspect’s person was admissible in court. In the case of a 
commentator, a soccer player may have fallen in the box and a 
referee may have awarded a penalty kick. The Justice’s or color 
commentator’s role is to evaluate and interpret these actions and 
determinations. With respect to the Justice: How does the behavior of 
the police officer compare to the behavior of police officers in other 
cases; is this the type of police action that violates the Constitution; 
did the trial judge err; what are the likely consequences of holding 
one way or another? With respect to the commentator: Did the 
referee get it right; has he been consistent in penalizing other similar 
actions throughout the match; is this player known to feign being 
fouled; if penalties are given in this situation, does this incentivize 
future players to dive?  
 In weighing in, the commentator and Justice undertake a process 
of creative interpretation, which, as Ronald Dworkin has framed it, 
“aims to impose purpose over the text or data or tradition being 
interpreted.”
46
 What is an illegal search? What type of contact in 
soccer ought to be punished? Both the commentator and Justice are 
author-critics adding to the traditions they interpret,
47
 even as they 
remain at a distance from relevant events. Although neither the color 
commentator nor the Justice is in a position to influence the game as 
it transpires, the analysis of each shapes the tradition, which impacts 
the future actions of various individuals. While much of the effect is 
ultimately felt by nonparticipants, this includes the actions of the 
“players” involved in the incident or controversy. In the case of a 
Justice’s interpretation, parties before the Court may face prison 
time, financial burdens, or other consequences. Likewise, a lower 
court may be forced to rehear a dispute, lose reputational capital, or 
be compelled to change its practices. In the case of a sports 
commentator’s interpretation, individual players may face public 
condemnation, lost sponsorship, economic penalties, or adverse 
treatment by officials in future matches.
48
 And referees may face 
reputational impacts, lost opportunities, and attacks by the public, 
among many other things.
49
 46. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 228 (1986). 
 47. See id. at 229. 
 48. For example, shaped by color commentators’ interpretations that he deliberately 
took a dive to win a penalty in a critical soccer match, Arsenal’s Eduardo da Silva has faced 
significant repercussions. See, e.g., Laura Williamson, Lay Off Eduardo, He’s Not a Diver! 
Arsene Wenger in Witch-Hunt Claims as Arsenal Striker is Hit by Cheat Charge,
DAILYMAILONLINE, Aug. 29, 2009, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article-1209807/ 
Lay-Eduardo-hes-NOT-diver-Arsene-Wenger-witch-hunt-claims-Arsenal-striker-hit-cheat-
charge.html. 
 49. See, e.g., Jason Burt, World Cup 2010: Holland Attack ‘Chump’ Howard Webb for 
Refereeing ‘Scandal’, TELEGRAPH, July 13, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/ 
competitions/world-cup-2010/news/7886086/World-Cup-2010-Holland-attack-chump-Howard-
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 The umpire, by contrast, does influence the game as it actually 
unfolds, rather than after the fact. Indeed, unlike Justices or color 
commentators, umpires are necessary for the game to even occur.
50
Contracts are written and broken, torts and murders are committed, 
and unconstitutional statutes are enacted and enforced all without 
the members of the Supreme Court lifting a finger, but without an 
umpire there is no official match.
51
 And as a game proceeds, the 
umpire is right there in the middle, directing traffic and changing 
patterns of behavior and outcomes. For example, when an umpire 
adopts a very tight strike zone, pitchers may avoid throwing certain 
pitches, more players may get on base, and more runs may be 
scored.
52
 The determinations of Justices and commentators may be no 
less important in the long term, but in the heat of the moment, the 
discussion up in the press box and the prospect of later Supreme 
Court guidance are not driving the action. 
 2.  The Limitations of Concrete Facts, Precedent, and Collaborative 
Creativity
 Given that commissioners perform their functions without directly 
participating in actual games, it would seem that the commissioner 
would be as equally apt an analogue as the color commentator, but, 
in fact, the commissioner is at liberty to be far more disengaged from 
actual game interactions. The color commentator and Justice, much 
more than the commissioner, are reacting to concrete real-world 
scenarios and must accommodate existing knowledge and precedent. 
Moreover, their work is fundamentally collaborative in a way that a 
commissioner’s is not. 
 The commentator is almost always addressing a particular 
matchup, a particular hit, or a particular call. Although these 
prompts may—and frequently do—lead to broader discussion with 
more wide-ranging implications, a commentator is necessarily 
constrained by the events that are occurring during the game. This is 
similar to the Justice who is always engaging in creative 
interpretation in the context of a specific case or controversy, rather 
Webb-for-refereeing-scandal.html (noting the impact of media attacks on World Cup 
referee Howard Webb).  
 50. See Playing Rules Comm., Major League Baseball, Official Baseball Rules R. 
9.01(a) (2010), available at http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/downloads/y2010/official_rules/2010_ 
OfficialBaseballRules.pdf. 
 51. See id.
 52. See, e.g., T. O. Whenham, MLB Umpires and Totals Betting, DOC’S SPORTS 
SERVICE (Feb. 16, 2008), http://www.docsports.com/current/mlb-umpires-totals-betting.html 
(describing the impact of particular umpires’ strike zones on the number of runners on 
base and runs scored). 
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than assessing abstract problems or dilemmas.
53
 In an opinion, a 
Justice may—and frequently does—use the facts of a case to offer 
more general guidance, define fundamental values, or develop a 
larger critique, but the particular facts are always the starting point.
54
 Commissioners are not generally responding to concrete incidents. 
They tend to focus on general trends or concerns rather than a 
particular call by an umpire or a particular game.
55
 Presented with 
the opportunity to engage in the type of creative interpretation and 
judgment typical of a Justice facing a particular case, commissioners 
usually decline.
56
 Indeed, in most of his work, the commissioner 
seems more of a legislative or executive figure, than a judicial one. 
Consider the “numerous dramatic changes to baseball” credited to 
Commissioner Bud Selig on his official MLB information page: 
“[i]nterleague play,” “[s]ignificant revenue sharing among clubs,” 
“[t]hree-division formats in the American and National Leagues,” 
“[a]n extra tier of playoffs and the Wild Card,” and “[t]he restoration 
of the rulebook strike zone.”
57
 They are creative products—the result 
of reason and forethought, certainly—but none of these seem to 
reference a process grounded in a set of particular game-related facts. 
In Dworkin’s terms, the commissioner enjoys the freedoms of a 
novelist, while the color commentator and Justice are better likened 
to authors of creative nonfiction, whose points of interpretive 
departure are defined real-world interactions, or serial novelists, 
whose creative interpretations are limited by previous installments.
58
 Concerning the latter, as with the Justice who must navigate a 
sea of judicial precedent, the process of interpretation for the color 
commentator depends on what is already known about the matter to 
be interpreted. Consider, for example, an interception thrown by New 
 53. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (outlining case and controversy requirement); 
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1911) (defining contours of requirement). 
 54. Justice Roberts made exactly this point during his confirmation hearing. See
Roberts Confirmation Hearings, supra note 6, at 161 (statement of J. John Roberts) (“So 
the obligation to decide cases is the only basis for the authority to interpret the 
Constitution and laws. That means that judges should be careful in making sure that they 
have a real case in front of them, a real live dispute between parties who have actual injury 
involved, actual interests at stake, because that is the basis for their legitimacy.”). 
 55. Zelinsky seems to acknowledge as much: “[T]he [c]ommissioner of Baseball relays 
instructions to the umpires regarding how to interpret the rules of Major League Baseball, 
rather than reviewing their every call.” Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 119. 
 56. See, e.g., Bud Selig Will Not Reverse Umpire’s Blown Call, SPORTING NEWS (June 
3, 2010), http://www.sportingnews.com/mlb/article/2010-06-03/selig-will-not-reverse-umpires-
blown-call (Commissioner Bud Selig did not “specifically address umpire Jim Joyce’s 
botched call Wednesday night that cost [Armando] Galarraga [a] perfect game . . . [but a] 
baseball official familiar with the decision confirmed to The Associated Press that the call 
was not being reversed.”). 
 57. Allan H. (Bud) Selig, MLB executives, MLB Official Info, MLB.COM,
http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/official_info/about_mlb/executives.jsp?bio=selig_bud (last visited 
July 2, 2011). 
 58. See DWORKIN, supra note 46, at 228-38. 
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England Patriots quarterback Tom Brady. During Brady’s first year 
in the league, following his selection in the sixth-round of the NFL 
draft, a color commentator might have reasonably interpreted the 
interception as resulting from Brady not being an NFL-grade 
talent.
59
 However, now, after Brady has won three Super Bowls, been 
selected to five Pro Bowls, and won numerous other individual 
accolades,
60
 using Dworkin’s language, such an opinion “would be a 
poor interpretation, not because no one could think it a good one 
[(just ask a Colts fan)], but because it is in fact, on all the criteria so 
far described, a poor one.”
61
 A further constraint for both the commentator and the Justice 
comes from the fact that the creative interpretation is usually 
collaborative. The umpire in chief may consult a first-base umpire on 
a checked swing and the commissioner of Major League Baseball may 
discuss a potential change with the rules committee,
62
 but these 
limited interactions are quite different from Justices and 
commentators who regularly construct a narrative together with 
coequal partners. One of the shared traits of both commentating 
teams and Justices is how they attempt to persuade one another and 
an external audience to move towards consensus, but how each 
participant is free to reach his or her own conclusions. The nuances 
of joining, concurring, and dissenting are central to understanding 
how the Supreme Court does its business—and in distinguishing the 
Court from other nation’s judiciaries
63
—but cannot be captured by 
either the commissioner or umpire analogies. These complexities, 
however, are quite familiar to commentators who often agree with 
the interpretations and judgments of their partners, but sometimes 
agree only with the conclusions and not with the reasoning, and still 
other times, agree with neither the conclusions nor the reasoning and 
explain to the audience why they view matters differently.  
 3.  Providing a Reasoned Explanation
 The final commonality between Justices and color commentators 
is that both sets of individuals offer explanations for their creative 
interpretations. Color commentators are in the business of 
 59. See Tom Brady—Official New England Patriots Biography, http://www.patriots.com/ 
team/roster/Tom-Brady/272d4f2c-1bb9-4372-b02c-dfa3fa60575b (last visited July 2, 2011). 
 60. Id.
 61. DWORKIN, supra note 46, at 233. 
 62. See Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 119. 
 63. In the Chinese system, for example, traditionally, no dissenting judgments have 
been allowed. ALBERT HUNG-YEE CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 114 (1998); see also Nanping Liu with Michelle Xiao Liu, 
Trick or Treat: Legal Reasoning in the Shadow of Corruption in the People’s Republic of 
China, 34 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 179, 236-39 (2008) (explaining recent limited 
experiments to introduce dissenting opinions into the Chinese judiciary).  
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storytelling. They fit this game, this play, this player, into a broader 
narrative. What does this strikeout mean for Big Papi? How 
significant is this win over the Phillies for the Mets? In what ways is 
LeBron James a better player than Michael Jordan was? Similarly, 
Justices do not just tell us whether the lower court judge got it right; 
they offer a narrative to contextualize, justify, explicate, and 
situate their interpretations in the form of opinions and their 
questions and comments at oral argument. And it is the narrative 
that Justices spin that facilitates the common law tradition. Without 
the rich explanations, the common law would lack weight, power, 
and legitimacy.  
 All of this is notably different than when an umpire weighs in on a 
matter. Umpires are far more like judges in China, where members 
of the judiciary have not traditionally explained their reasoning and 
where few of the brief decisions of the Supreme People’s Court are 
published.
64
 Umpires yell, “Strike!” “Ball!” “Safe!” “You’re out!” They 
do not generally provide a narrative—and, on those very rare 
occasions when they do offer a few words of justification or 
contextualization, it is not to the public; it is a private explanation 
provided to an angry coach who storms out of the dugout or a 
distraught player who thought he was safe.
65
 If Justices were like 
umpires, they would never pen thousands of pages each term for 
public consumption and certainly would never read opinions from the 
bench as Chief Justice Roberts and the rest of the Court have done on 
numerous occasions.
66
 Zelinsky comes closest to addressing the Justice as narrator when 
he discusses how commissioners offer “interpretive guidance to their 
subordinates.”
67
 However, interpretive guidance is not a narrative. It 
is more like a carefully spun out rule. When Justices engage in the 
narrative process they are not simply providing a check list for how 
future courts should handle similar cases: they are explaining 
traditions, situating events and determinations within historical 
context, defining values, and giving voice to the voiceless, among 
many other things.  
 64. See, e.g., Lindsay Wilson, Note, Investors Beware: The WTO Will Not Cure All Ills 
with China, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1007, 1013 (noting that opinions are subject to 
only internal court circulation); see also JAMES M. ZIMMERMAN, CHINA LAW DESKBOOK
64 (2d ed. 2005) (“[T]here is no formal system of judicial precedent [in the Chinese 
legal system].”). 
 65. Part of the reason, of course, is that umpires do not generally need to provide an 
explanation—their calls are self-evident in a way that Justices’ determinations are not.  
 66. See Charles Lane, Split Roberts Court Cements Shift to Right, SEATTLE TIMES,
June 29, 2007, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2003767319_ 
scotuspost29.html (describing Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer reading their 
opinions in the case of Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District 
No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 709, 803 (2007)). 
 67. Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 120. 
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 Appreciating the narrative process of interpretative collaboration 
with coequals based on concrete facts common to both Justices and 
color commentators reveals the complexity and richness of the 
Supreme Court’s work, yet, as suggested in the sections that 
follow, the commentator analogy is also beneficial in highlighting 
the unappreciated biases and vulnerabilities that Justices bring to 
the bench.  
C.  The Color Commentator as Everyman 
 1.  Bringing the Justice and the Law Down to Earth
 In offering his commissioner analogy, Zelinsky does well to 
acknowledge that Chief Justice Roberts’ conception of the Justice as 
umpire is a tool, not simply a description: its purpose is to advance “a 
model of judicial restraint.”
68
 Zelinsky counters Roberts’ idea that 
Justices, like umpires, “don’t make the rules, they apply them,”
69
 by 
showing how “[t]he [c]ommissioner’s rulemaking powers are 
analogous to the discretion the Supreme Court enjoys.”
70
 This critique is valuable, but Zelinsky misses the fact that 
Roberts’ articulation of the Justice as umpire is a weapon in another 
more fundamental battle than the one over whether Justices make 
law or simply apply it. This clash is over the capacity of Justices to be 
objective, neutral arbiters assessing the claims before them 
dispassionately and without biases, and, more broadly, over an 
understanding of the law as neutral, clearly defined, uniform, 
and singular.  
 Although it is a debate which has been simmering for many 
decades,
71
 in recent years, it was drawn to the surface most notably 
during Justice Sotomayor’s confirmation hearings because of prior 
comments that she had made about the process of adjudication. 
Sotomayor had previously taken the position that “[p]ersonal 
experiences affect the facts that judges choose to see,”
72
 and that 
judges might be incapable of being impartial “in all or even in most 
cases.”
73
 As she explained, given the ambiguities of the law, 
interpretation is inevitable, and “[w]hether born from experience or 
inherent physiological or cultural differences, . . . our gender and 
national origins may and will make a difference in our judging.”
74
 68. Id. at 117. 
 69. See Roberts Confirmation Hearings, supra note 6, at 55.
 70. Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 124. 
 71. Indeed, way back in the nineteenth century, individuals like Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr. were staking out positions in the debate. See, e.g., O. W. HOLMES, JR., THE 
COMMON LAW 1 (1881) (“The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”).  
 72.  Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge’s Voice, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 87, 91, 92 (2002).
 73. Id. at 91. 
 74. Id. at 92. 
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 Those in Chief Justice Roberts’ camp strongly contest this 
conception: instead, they want to engrain an image of the Justice as a 
white lab-coated technician pulling the levers of a pristine and 
crystalline machine.
75
 And Zelinsky seems quite content to acquiesce 
to this notion. Indeed, his replacement analogy seems only to change 
who happens to be operating the apparatus.
76
 With their finely 
starched white coats, both Roberts’ umpire Justice and Zelinsky’s 
commissioner Justice are men above the fray, capable of setting aside 
their backgrounds and experiences to engage in rational and 
objective reasoning. Moreover, Zelinsky’s analogy implicitly assumes 
that “preserving the integrity of [the] game”—the “fundamental duty” 
of the Justice and commissioner—has a single, clear, definite 
meaning that any reasonable, intelligent person could recognize and 
strive towards.
77
 2.  Evidence of Bias and Malleability
The best evidence from social psychology and related fields and 
the best empirical studies of judicial behavior, however, strongly 
undermine this understanding. Often what seems to be so clearly, 
objectively, and universally true is actually contingent on how things 
are presented to us and on our particular backgrounds and experiences.  
 One of the most compelling demonstrations of this dynamic 
actually comes from an experiment in which participants were asked 
to take on the role of a sports commentator assessing the fouls 
committed during a particularly violent November 1951 football 
game between the Dartmouth Indians and the Princeton Tigers.
78
Although the student participants from Princeton and Dartmouth 
watched the same footage and used the same rating system, they saw 
a very different game.
79
 The Dartmouth participants judged the 
teams to be fairly equally culpable for the fouls, while the Princeton 
participants judged the Princeton team to have committed about half 
as many infractions.
80
 Although they were not aware of it, students’ 
 75. Sotomayor’s comments caused such a backlash that during her confirmation 
hearings, Sotomayor was forced to distance herself from her earlier position and, in the 
words of Dahlia Lithwick, “stag[e] what was, in effect, a three-day infomercial for judges as 
mechanical umpires who simply ‘apply the law’ by ‘calling balls and strikes.’ ” Dahlia 
Lithwick, The Sotomayor Test: Will She Limit Obama's Next Pick?, NEWSWEEK, July 23, 
2009, available at http://www.newsweek.com/2009/07/22/the-sotomayor-test.html (asserting 
that “Sotomayor has proved conclusively that it’s John Roberts’[] world now—we all just 
rent space there”).
 76. Perhaps Zelinsky’s commissioner Justice also enjoys the ability to occasionally 
reprogram the machine.  
 77. Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 125. 
 78. Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J.
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 129, 130 (1954). 
 79.  Id. at 130-31. 
 80.  Id. at 131-32. 
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perceptions were being powerfully influenced by their university 
affiliations.
81
 As the experimenters, Albert Hastorf and Hadley 
Cantril, later concluded, “[T]here is no such ‘thing’ as a ‘game’ 
existing ‘out there’ in its own right which people merely ‘observe.’ The 
‘game’ ‘exists’ for a person and is experienced by him only in so far as 
certain happenings have significances in terms of his purpose.”
82
 Building on this research, academics associated with the Cultural 
Cognition Project at Yale Law School have conducted a number of 
recent studies investigating how cultural values influence how we 
make sense of the world.
83
 The work reveals how humans are inclined 
“to conform their beliefs about disputed matters of fact . . . to values 
that define their cultural identities.”
84
 In one 2009 study, for 
example, Dan Kahan, David Hoffman, and Donald Braman showed 
that the cognition of even the seemingly most objective type of 
evidence in a case—a videotape of the events at issue—is subject to 
the influence of a viewer’s identity-defining characteristics and 
commitments.
85
 Allowing 1,350 Americans to view a video of a high-
speed police chase that the Supreme Court majority considered to so 
clearly and conclusively dispute the respondent’s version of events 
that summary judgment was in order,
86
 Kahan, Hoffman, and 
Braman found notable divergence in perceptions—along cultural, 
ideological, and other lines—related to whether the chase was worth 
the risk, how dangerous it was, and who was at fault for the eventual 
crash, among other things.
87
 Taken together, this research suggests that there is not one true, 
impartial take on the facts of a case. And there is no such thing as 
the “law” existing “out there” in its own right which people merely 
 81.  Id. at 132.
 82. Id. at 133.
 83. See, e.g., Donald Braman & Dan M. Kahan, Overcoming the Fear of Guns, the Fear 
of Gun Control, and the Fear of Cultural Politics: Constructing a Better Gun Debate, 55 
EMORY L.J. 569 (2006); John Gastil et al., Deliberation Across the Cultural Divide: 
Assessing the Potential for Reconciling Conflicting Cultural Orientations to Reproductive 
Technology, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1772 (2008); Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal 
State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115 (2007); Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition 
and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149 (2006); Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, 
The Self-Defensive Cognition of Self-Defense, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2008). For other 
papers, see THE CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT AT YALE LAW SCHOOL,
http://www.culturalcognition.net/ (last visited July 2, 2011) [hereinafter THE CULTURAL 
COGNITION PROJECT].
 84. THE CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT, supra note 83. 
 85. See Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris
and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009) [hereinafter Kahan et 
al., Whose Eyes?].
 86. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81 (2007). As the Court asserted, “[T]he 
videotape . . . speak[s] for itself.” Id. at 378 n.5. 
 87. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes?, supra note 85, at 872-79. In the researchers’ words, the 
study showed that “different people, with different experiences, can see different things.” 
Id. at 848. 
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“observe.” Certainly, there are statutes and legal opinions 
announcing certain rules, but those rules are generally subject to 
numerous interpretations and rearticulations—a fact borne out by 
many split decisions at the Supreme Court and the number of 
distinguished lawyers who make compelling arguments in support of 
divergent understandings.
88
 If a person’s particular cultural and other commitments shape 
cognition of events, so too do exterior situational frames and cues.
89
Indeed, other psychological studies have shown that manipulations 
as subtle as changing a camera angle can influence how people make 
sense of others’ actions and apportion causal responsibility and 
blame when watching video footage.
90
 In one set of experiments, 
participants observed a mock interrogation shot from the perspective 
of the interrogator, the suspect being questioned, or a third party.
91
Those observing events from the perspective of the suspect were 
significantly more likely to judge the resulting confession to be 
coerced and the suspect to be not guilty than those provided with the 
perspective of the interrogator.
92
 For a partial real-world example of 
the same phenomenon, one need only consider the way viewing an 
instant replay can alter our understanding of whether a foul was 
committed, a ball was caught before it hit the ground, or a runner 
was safe—as well as our attributions concerning the referee. 
Watching a clip in slow motion, shot with a zoom lens, it is evident to 
us that the ball touched the ground and that the referee’s 
determination of a completed pass references his bias. But watching 
 88. Justice Elena Kagan made exactly this point during her confirmation hearings: 
“[N]ot every case is decided 9-0 and that’s not because anyone’s acting in bad faith. It’s 
because those legal judgments are ones in which reasonable people can reasonably disagree 
sometimes.” See Kagan Confirmation Hearings, supra note 9. 
 89. The Project on Law and Mind Sciences at Harvard Law School has been active in 
chronicling the impact of this dynamic for law and legal theory. See, e.g., Adam Benforado, 
Frames of Injustice: The Bias We Overlook, 85 IND. L.J. 1333 (2010) [hereinafter Benforado, 
Frames of Injustice]; Adam Benforado et al., Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in America,
53 EMORY L.J. 1645 (2004); Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The 
Influence of Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103 
(2004); Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of 
Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2004); Jon Hanson & David 
Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, 
Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (2003); Jon Hanson & David 
Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal,
93 GEO. L.J. 1 (2004).  
 90. See, e.g., Jennifer J. Ratcliff et al., Camera Perspective Bias in Videotaped 
Confessions: Experimental Evidence of Its Perceptual Basis, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
APPLIED 197, 197 (2006) (providing an overview). 
 91. See id.
 92. See, e.g., G. Daniel Lassiter et al., Videotaped Confessions: Is Guilt in the Eye of 
the Camera?, 33 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 189, 206 (2001); G. Daniel 
Lassiter, Videotaped Confessions: The Impact of Camera Point of View on Judgments of 
Coercion, 3 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 268, 268 (1986).  
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the exact same play in real time from the stands, the same 
perceptions and attributions become less likely.  
 In other work, conducted over the last half century, scientists 
have found numerous additional ways in which minor alterations in 
our environments can produce dramatic changes in our perceptions, 
judgments, and actions.
93
 We assume that we would always interpret 
statutory language or the facts of a case in a certain way, but 
elements in our situations that appear to be irrelevant can lead us to 
very different conclusions. Ask someone how fast two cars were 
traveling when they “smashed” together in a film of an automobile 
accident and you are likely to get an answer nine miles-an-hour 
faster than if you use the word “contacted.”
94
 Give someone a heavy 
clipboard while they are filling out a survey and they will report that 
an issue is significantly more important than if you give them a light 
clipboard.
95
 Change the name on the top of a resume from Greg to 
Jamal, leaving all of the substantive information the same, and see 
the number of callback interviews drop precipitously.
96
 We, quite 
simply, are not the clear-sighted, consistent, and objective perceivers 
and assessors that we imagine ourselves to be. 
 The umpire analogy—in propagating a narrative of judicial 
exceptionalism—implies that, even if the preceding is true, Justices 
must somehow be immune from these tendencies and influences, but, 
in fact, judges demonstrate exactly the same cognitive biases as 
members of the general population. Their backgrounds and 
experiences drive their perceptions, assessments, and attributions—
even as they believe that they are acting completely objectively.
97
Jeffrey Rachlinski, for example, recently documented that judges, 
“like the rest of us, carry implicit biases concerning race” and that 
“these implicit biases can affect judges’ judgment.”
98
 Likewise, 
 93. See Benforado, Frames of Injustice, supra note 89, at 1347-60 (providing an 
overview of studies); Julie Seaman, Hate Speech and Identity Politics: A Situationalist 
Proposal, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 112 (2008) (“Many studies performed in recent years 
support the proposition that situational elements—the physical, institutional, social, 
cultural and linguistic environment in which a person is situated—affect individual 
thought and action in measurable and fairly predictable ways.”). 
 94. See Elizabeth F. Loftus & John C. Palmer, Reconstruction of Automobile 
Destruction: An Example of the Interaction Between Language and Memory, 13 J. VERBAL 
LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 585, 586-87 (1974). 
 95. See Nils B. Jostmann et al., Weight as an Embodiment of Importance, 20 PSYCHOL.
SCI. 1169, 1173 (2009). 
 96. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More 
Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market 
Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991, 998 (2004); see also Marianne Bertrand et al., 
Implicit Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 94 (2005).  
 97. See generally Kahan et al., Whose Eyes?, supra note 85 (offering evidence of such a 
dynamic in the context of Scott v. Harris).
 98. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges? 84 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1221 (2009). 
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exterior cues and frames have been shown to influence judges’ 
cognitions in simulations, including those involving the manipulation 
of camera angles.
99
 Bolstering these psychological studies, political 
scientists and legal scholars have completed empirical work 
establishing that federal judges—far from neutral and objective—
have ideologically-biased voting patterns.
100
 Hence, as research in social psychology, social cognition, and 
related fields continues to expand into new areas, there is an 
emerging consensus that even those who seem so clearly immune to 
the influence of the unseen currents and rocky shoals of the mind—
indeed, those we have long been held up as exemplars in that 
respect—are vulnerable to the influence of knowledge structures, 
affective states, motives, and other interior situational factors. 
Indeed, in a grandly ironic twist, there is growing evidence that 
referees, while believing themselves to be completely neutral and 
fair, may frequently manage the fields of play in biased ways.
101
Thus, while scholars like Michael Allen are right to point out “that 
there are influences in judging that effect outcomes beyond the 
nature of the ‘play,’ ”
102
 they are incorrect that “[s]imilar influences 
tend to be absent from umpiring.”
103
 As Roy Askins has written, “During the course of any contest 
there are many incidents which appear ambiguous, even to veteran 
officials. When this occurs, officials do basically what all humans do 
in such situations, i.e., they seek clarification through any means 
available at the time.”
104
 Factors like “the color of a player’s 
uniform[,] preceding foul judgments[,] a team’s reputation[,] and 
 99. See, e.g., G. Daniel Lassiter & Andrew L. Geers, Bias and Accuracy in the 
Evaluation of Confession Evidence, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT
197, 207 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004). 
 100. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Thomas J. Miles, Depoliticizing Administrative Law,
58 DUKE L.J. 2193 (2009) (finding partisan bias in judicial decision making with respect to 
upholding or striking down federal agency determinations in a study of federal 
court decisions).  
 101. See, e.g., Norbert Hagemann et al., When the Referee Sees Red . . . , 19 PSYCHOL.
SCI. 769, 769 (2008) (noting that “it is extremely difficult for [referees] to make objective 
judgments . . . [and] their judgments may show biases like those found in other social 
judgments”); Alexander Kranjec et al., A Sinister Bias for Calling Fouls in Soccer, PLOS
ONE, July 2010, at 1, 1 (2010) (noting that “[l]ow-level perceptual biases can influence 
higher-order officiating judgments in . . . sports that involve ambiguity”). 
 102. Michael P. Allen, A Limited Defense of (at Least Some of) the Umpire Analogy, 32 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 525, 533 (2009). In fact, by only focusing on the impact of a judge’s life 
experience and judicial philosophy, Allen casts the set of influences on judicial behavior as 
far more “visible” and far narrower than they actually are. See id.
 103. Id.
 104. Roy L. Askins, Observations: The Official Reacting to Pressure, REFEREE, Nov. 
1978, at 17, 18. 
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[home team] crowd noise” are not supposed to have any impact on the 
judgments of sports officials and yet they all seem to be influential.
105
 Recent research, for example, shows that soccer referees are 
significantly more likely to award a foul to the taller of two players 
involved in an ambiguous foul situation.
106
 They also call more fouls 
when seeing a right-to-left attack than when seeing one moving from 
left-to-right.
107
 Other researchers have found that referees are 
inclined to grant more points to tae kwon do athletes wearing red 
than they are to those wearing blue.
108
 In addition, college basketball 
referees demonstrate bias against visiting teams, and the larger the 
difference in fouls between two opposing squads, the more likely it is 
that they blow the next whistle on the team that has fewer fouls.
109
Most troubling, a study of the National Basketball Association found 
that white referees are more likely to call fouls on black players than 
white players.
110
 It is not that these N.B.A. referees are explicitly 
bigoted any more than the Premiership referees have explicit 
preferences for short people. Just as with judges, the cognitive 
mechanisms at work often operate at an implicit level, which make 
them hard to notice and equally hard to accept.  
 105. Niels van Quaquebeke & Steffen R. Giessner, How Embodied Cognitions Affect 
Judgments: Height-Related Attribution Bias in Football Foul Calls, 32 J. SPORT &
EXERCISE PSYCHOL. 3, 14 (2010) (citations omitted). 
 106. Id.
 107. Kranjec et al., supra note 101, at 3. 
 108. Hagemann et al., supra note 101, at 770. 
 109. Kyle J. Anderson & David A. Pierce, Officiating Bias: The Effect of Foul 
Differential on Foul Calls in NCAA Basketball, 27 J. SPORTS SCI. 687, 692-93 (2009). 
Similar effects have been found for soccer refereeing. See, e.g., Ryan H. Boyko et al., Referee 
Bias Contributes to Home Advantage in English Premiership Football, 25 J. SPORTS SCI.
1185, 1191-94 (2007) (finding that English Premiership away teams were judged to have 
committed more penalties and scored fewer goals than home teams); Peter Dawson et al., 
Are Football Referees Really Biased and Inconsistent?: Evidence on the Incidence of 
Disciplinary Sanction in the English Premier League, 170 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y: SERIES A 
231, 249 (2007) (finding that English Premiership referees were more likely to award 
yellow and red cards against the away team); Matthias Sutter & Martin G. Kocher, 
Favoritism of Agents—the Case of Referees’ Home Bias, 25 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 461, 467-68 
(2004) (finding that German Bundesliga referees awarded more stoppage time in matches 
in which the home team was losing than in matches in which they were winning, giving the 
home team a greater opportunity to equalize the score).  
 110. Joseph Price & Justin Wolfers, Racial Discrimination Among NBA Referees, IZA
DISCUSSION PAPER No. 2863, June 2007, available at http://ideas.repec.org/a/tpr/qjecon/ 
v125y2010i4p1859-1887.html (finding that the “biases are sufficiently large that [there 
are] . . . appreciable differences in whether predominantly black teams are more likely to 
win or lose, based on the racial composition of the refereeing crew”); but see Alan Schwarz, 
Study of N.B.A. Sees Racial Bias in Calling Fouls, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/02/sports/basketball/02refs.html (noting that the N.B.A. 
conducted its own study and found no bias in refereeing, but that that study was judged by 
experts to be far less sound than the one conducted by Price and Wolfers). 
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 3.  A Salve to Cognitive Illiberalism
 The color commentator analogy acknowledges the reality that 
none of us—including judges—come to interpretive tasks free of 
biases and immune to situational primes. Color commentators are, in 
many ways, stand-ins for members of the public—we expect them to 
offer their opinions, to have allegiances and preconceptions, to see 
the game through colored lenses, and to be emotional. By analogizing 
the Justice to the color commentator we can make explicit that 
judges are real people and are vulnerable to the same cognitive 
proclivities and exterior frames as the rest of us. And by bringing 
Justices down to earth, we can be in a far better position to reduce 
and control for biases.  
 If our goal is to have Justices act in ways that are truly objective 
and unbiased, ironically, the solution is not to propagate an analogy 
that suggests that judges are like umpires; it is to propagate one that 
suggests that judges are like everyone else.  
 Recent research contests Michael Allen’s claim that “judges will 
never be able to prevent their life experiences or even overall judicial 
philosophies from influencing their decisions.”
111
 As discussed in the 
previous section, there are many structures and processes in our 
brains operating beyond our conscious awareness or control, but, as 
Jennifer Joy-Gaba and Brian Nosek detail, there is a “growing body 
of evidence challenging the assumption of automatic inflexibility . . . 
[and offering a] new understanding of automaticity as contextually 
sensitive and amenable to change.”
112
 The increasingly rich literature 
offers insight into both the conditions that encourage decreased 
schema reliance and on debiasing more generally.
113
 In the context of 
overcoming implicit biases, two particularly promising approaches 
include “increasing vigilance about one’s subtle behavior . . . and 
educating people about their implicit biases.”
114
 If “motivation to 
avoid bias can help lessen the likelihood of its operation,”
115
 the first 
 111. Allen, supra note 102, at 533. 
 112. Jennifer A. Joy-Gaba & Brian A. Nosek, The Surprisingly Limited Malleability of 
Implicit Racial Evaluations, 41 SOC. PSYCHOL. 137, 137 (2010). 
 113. See, e.g., Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The Great Attributional Divide: How 
Divergent Views of Human Behavior Are Shaping Legal Policy, 57 EMORY L.J. 311, 331-37 
(2008) (providing an overview of the research).  
 114. John T. Jost et al., The Existence of Implicit Bias is Beyond Reasonable Doubt: A 
Refutation of Ideological and Methodological Objections and Executive Summary of Ten 
Studies that No Manager Should Ignore, 29 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 39, 56 (2009).  
 115. Antony Page & Michael J. Pitts, Poll Workers, Election Administration, and the 
Problem of Implicit Bias, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 36 (2009) (reviewing research); see also
Patricia G. Devine et al., The Regulation of Explicit and Implicit Race Bias: The Role of 
Motivations to Respond Without Prejudice, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 835, 845-47 
(2002) (investigating the influence of internal and external motivations on reducing race 
bias); E. Ashby Plant & Patricia G. Devine, Internal and External Motivation to Respond 
Without Prejudice, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 811, 811 (1998) (same). 
474 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:451 
step is to understand and accept that we are not rational, neutral, 
and objective beings.
116
 As Rachlinski and his coauthors have found, 
“when judges are aware of a need to monitor their own responses for 
the influence of implicit racial biases, and are motivated to suppress 
that bias, they appear able to do so”
117
—yet the “[c]ontrol of implicit 
bias requires active, conscious control.”
118
 Other researchers have 
documented similar results “that implicit bias can be recognized and 
modulated to counteract its effect on” critical real world decisions.
119
But, again, the key is awareness and attention to the fact that we 
carry unconscious tendencies that can influence our cognition and are 
susceptible to frames and cues in our environment that can lead us to 
depart from true rational objectivity. 
 Thus, encouraging the myth that judges are capable of 
dispassionately and neutrally calling “balls and strikes” is a great 
way to ensure that they will never actually do so.
120
 There is a danger, of course, that acknowledging that Justices 
carry biases may damage the respect that the judiciary enjoys. This 
is a genuine concern given research showing that the perceived 
legitimacy of legal authorities is both critically important to 
maintaining citizen compliance with the law
121
 and dependent on 
whether citizens believe that members of the judiciary employ fair, 
unbiased procedures.
122
 However, a judiciary whose legitimacy is 
 116. See Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist 
Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1090 (2006) (“As a threshold matter, 
in order to correct bias, decision makers . . . must be made aware of their own implicit biases.”).
 117. Rachlinski et al., supra note 98, at 1221. 
 118. Id. at 1225. 
 119. Alexander R. Green et al., Implicit Bias Among Physicians and Its Prediction of 
Thrombolysis Decisions for Black and White Patients, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1231, 
1235-37 (2007) (studying physicians treating coronary artery disease in black and white patients). 
 120. Former Dean of Columbia University Law School Harlan Fiske Stone made a 
similar point about the dangers of “lack of candor” some 75 years ago:  
[O]ne of the evil features, a very evil one, about all this assumption that judges 
only find the law and don’t make it, often becomes the evil of a lack of candor. 
By covering up the lawmaking function of judges, we miseducate the people and 
fail to bring out into the open the real responsibility of judges for what they do. 
Edward Lazarus, Overall, the Miers Nomination Is Troubling—But It Does Have One 
Virtue, FINDLAW (Oct. 13, 2005), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/lazarus/20051013.html 
(quoting Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone).  
 121. See John Darley et al., Psychological Jurisprudence: Taking Psychology and Law 
into the Twenty-First Century, in 14 PERSPECTIVES IN LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY, TAKING 
PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 37, 43 (James R. P. Ogloff ed., 
2002) (“[A]lthough the threat of punishment is always in the background when dealing 
with legal authorities, most people accept the decisions of those authorities not because 
they fear them, but because they view their actions as legitimate.”); TOM R. TYLER, WHY
PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 161 (1990) (providing evidence that individuals are more likely to 
defer to authorities assessed to be legitimate). 
 122. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the 
Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 
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based on the dissemination of a myth of fairness and impartiality, 
while delivering neither, is not worthy of respect or deference.  
 Selling such a myth through the use of the umpire analogy is 
particularly objectionable because it facilitates the marginalization of 
certain viewpoints, approaches, and assessments. As social 
psychologists have documented, it is already our natural proclivity to 
(1) believe that we see the world as it actually is (that is, neutrally 
and accurately), (2) assume that other reasonable people will see 
things exactly as we do, and (3) conclude that those who see things 
differently must be biased, ill-informed, or lacking in intelligence.
123
The umpire analogy encourages this process by offering assurance 
that our gut is correct: there is just one objective way to look at the 
law and facts, and it is our way. If the law is understood to be 
neutral, clearly defined, uniform, and singular, then the reason that 
others see things differently comes down to “ignorance, 
misinformation, bias, irrationality, and disloyalty.”
124
 The result is “a 
state of cognitive illiberalism” with “distort[ed] judicial 
decisionmaking on factual issues that divide competing cultural and 
societal groups” and an “escalating cycle of recrimination and 
distrust.”
125
 If Chief Justice Roberts is an umpire simply calling balls 
and strikes, it is not possible for another Justice or another citizen to 
reasonably disagree with him. A Justice who views matters 
differently than the Chief must be an “activist” with an agenda 
trying to legislate from the bench.  
III.  FLIPPING THE COIN: WHAT JUDGING CAN TEACH US ABOUT 
SPORTS COMMENTATING
 In the preceding pages, the argument has been that Justices are 
like color commentators and that by drawing the analogy we can 
learn something important about the nature of Supreme Court 
adjudication to the ultimate benefit of the institution. However, if the 
analogy is truly robust it seems plausible that we might also take 
what we know about the work of the Court to illuminate sports 
commentary. While the discussion that follows is only meant to be 
evocative, considering the potential bidirectional nature of our legal 
metaphors may be a promising avenue for future research.  
993 (2003) (arguing the voluntary compliance with the law is dependent on the justice 
system’s reputation for fairness); Darley et al., supra note 121, at 55 (same). 
 123. See Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, Naïve Realism in Everyday Life: Implications for 
Social Conflict and Misunderstanding, in VALUES AND KNOWLEDGE 103, 110-11 (Edward S. 
Reed et al. eds., 1996) (terming this tendency “naïve realism”).  
 124. Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, Naïve Cynicism: Maintaining False Perceptions 
in Policy Debates, 57 EMORY L.J. 499, 573 (2008). 
 125. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes?, supra note 85, at 895-96 (emphasis omitted). 
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A.  The Insights of Legal Realism 
 Although greatly reinforced by recent evidence from psychology 
and empirical work by political scientists and legal scholars, in many 
ways, the insight that judges are subject to biases and that often 
there is no single objective view of the facts or correct interpretation 
of the law has its origin in the work of legal realists in the early- and 
mid-twentieth century.
126
 Over a span of decades, legal realists 
peeled back the veil on judicial decisionmaking to lay bare that 
judicial determinations were often grounded not in the unambiguous 
text of a statute or binding precedent, but in public dynamics, 
cultural traditions, and the judge’s individual psychology and 
“political, economic, and professional background and activities.”
127
 Consequently, as a loose test of the strength of the analogy 
between Justices and sports commentators, it is worth considering 
whether the tools developed by legal realists to expose the true 
nature of judging might be used to expose parallel hidden realities of 
sports commentating.  
 By way of a concrete illustration, consider Karl Llewellyn’s famous 
analysis of the canons of statutory interpretation used by appellate 
judges, including Supreme Court Justices, to construe the meanings 
of ambiguous statutes.
128
 Llewellyn showed that although judges 
regularly cite principles or rules of parsing case law and statutes as if 
they are clearly established and dictate a particular, singular 
interpretation and resultant outcome, it is the desired outcome that 
often seems to drive—perhaps unconsciously—the choice of what 
amount to contradictory canons.
129
 For instance, to justify and 
explain a holding that the EPA overstepped its bounds in regulating 
water features on golf courses, a Justice might select the canon that 
“[a] statute cannot go beyond its text.”
130
 On the other hand, to justify 
and explain the opposite holding that the EPA has authority to 
regulate the implicated features, a Justice might select the canon 
that “[t]o effect its purpose a statute may be implemented beyond its 
text.”
131
 When confronted individually, the canons seem to fit nicely 
 126. See, e.g., Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 50, 52-53 (Martin P. Golding & William A. 
Edmundson eds., 2005). 
 127. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 
COLUM. L. REV 809, 846 (1935); see also JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 120 
(1963) (describing the “personality of the judge” as “the pivotal factor in law 
administration”); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
53 (1960) (noting that “the men of our appellate bench are human beings” who, like all 
human beings, are gripped, shaped, limited, and guided by various traditions and other forces).  
 128. LLEWELLYN, supra note 127, at 521-35.  
 129. See id.
 130. Id. at 522. 
 131. Id.
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into Chief Justice Roberts’ world where umpire judges 
dispassionately apply neutral rules, but when matched with their 
opposing numbers, the farce of the objective, robotic Justice is 
exposed. For a list of additional examples, see Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Canons of Statutory Construction 
THRUST BUT PARRY 
“Statutes in derogation of 
the common law will not be 
extended by 
construction.”
132
 “Such acts will be liberally 
construed if their nature is 
remedial.”
133
“If language is plain and 
unambiguous it must be 
given effect.”
134
 “Not when literal 
interpretation would lead to 
absurd or mischievous 
consequences or thwart 
manifest purpose.”
135
“Every word and clause 
must be given effect.”
136
 “If inadvertently inserted or 
if repugnant to the rest of the 
statute, they may be rejected 
as surplusage.”
137
“Expression of one thing 
excludes another.”
138
 “The language may fairly 
comprehend many different 
cases where some only are 
expressly mentioned by way 
of example.”
139
B.  Applying Realist Insights to Color Commentating 
 As with appellate judges construing law, the “accepted 
convention” with respect to interpreting ambiguous sporting actions 
and events “requires discussion as if only one single correct meaning 
could exist.”
140
 It is assumed that the actions that players, coaches, or 
teams take—for example, refusing to participate in voluntary 
workouts with the team during the offseason, spending a lot of money 
on free agents, or building a team around defense—have uniform, 
predictable consequences. In fact, various situational variables mean 
that the same action can lead to disparate outcomes and so there 
must be different—and frequently contradictory—canons of 
 132.  Id.
 133.  Id.
 134.  Id. at 524. 
 135. Id.
 136.  Id. at 525. 
 137.  Id.
 138.  Id. at 526. 
 139.  Id.
 140. Id. at 521. 
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interpretation. Announcers and sports writers often proclaim things 
with such assurance that we forget that they delivered exactly the 
opposite explanation in the last game. To justify and explain a 
football team grinding out a fourteen to zero win, the chosen canon is 
“great defenses win championships.” When a different team cruises 
to a fifty-six to twenty-eight victory, the explanation is “all-pro 
quarterbacks bring Super Bowl rings.” The outcome drives the 
selection of the canon. For some selected examples, see Figure 2, 
which shows canons commonly employed after a win (here, the 
“thrust”) and matching canons commonly employed after a loss (here, 
the “parry”).   
Figure 2: Canons of Sports Interpretation  
THRUST BUT PARRY 
A rant to the media by a 
star player is sometimes 
just what’s needed to set a 
fire under a team. 
 This type of selfish action 
always serves as a serious 
distraction and hurts team 
cohesion. 
After last week’s dominant 
performance, it was clear 
that these guys were going 
to come in and steamroll 
the competition. 
 What happened was after the 
big win, they got cocky and 
looked past their next 
opponent.
As frequently occurs when a 
key player goes down, other 
guys on the team stepped 
up their games. 
 Few teams can overcome the 
loss of their leader. 
Getting tossed or a 
technical foul can be a very 
effective way to wake your 
team up. 
 When coaches lose their cool, 
their teams often lose focus.  
When you’ve been sitting on 
the bench for weeks nursing 
an injury and finally have a 
chance to play, you come in 
and give it your all. 
 When you’ve been sidelined 
all season and you finally 
come back, you’re bound to be 
cautious and careful. You 
need some time to get the 
rust out. 
Calling a timeout at the end 
is just what an experienced 
coach knows he needs to do. 
It’s always a good idea to 
bring your guys in, calm 
them down, and draw up a 
winning play.  
 It’s always dangerous 
breaking the flow at the end 
and it gives the defense a 
chance to catch their breath. 
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 Thus, sports canons—like their judicial counterparts—often come 
in clashing pairs, but since they almost never both show up at once, it 
is easy to miss the contradiction and the fact that commentators—
like Justices—are not impartial analysts applying neutral rules of 
interpretation to unambiguous facts. Even as they believe in their 
own objectivity, they may be unconscious partisans selectively 
choosing interpretive rules and relevant facts to reach or justify a 
desired outcome. 
IV.  CONCLUSION
 In the end, the allure of the umpire Justice and the commissioner 
Justice may have a lot to do with the certainty and control they seem 
to invoke. Just as it is cognitively appealing to believe that the law is 
clear, uniform, singular, and neutral, it is also appealing to believe 
that those charged with applying the law are enlightened souls, 
unbiased, with cloudless vision and perfect objectivity. As Justice 
David Souter recently asked, “Is there any one of us who has not 
lived through moments, or years, of longing for a world without 
ambiguity, and for the stability of something unchangeable in 
human intuitions?”
141
 Unfortunately, that is not the world we live in. As Souter aptly 
put it, judging is not—and cannot be—“a straightforward exercise of 
reading fairly and viewing facts objectively.”
142
 A Supreme Court 
Justice is like a color commentator charged with the task of creative 
interpretation and explanation, but subject to the same external 
frames and cues and the same cognitive pulls and pushes as all of us. 
Acknowledging this reality does not imperil the judiciary; it shows us 
the true nature of the playing field so that we can continue the long 
and ongoing process of filling the holes and leveling the pitch. 
 141. Souter, supra note 42. 
 142. Id.
